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Federal Technology Transfer:
Should We Build Subarus in Bethesda?
Christopher J. Harnett*
Introduction
For more than 100 years, the National Institutes of Health (NIH)
have been at the forefront of innovative biomedical research. Employees
of the NIH have won four Nobel Prizes and 12 Lasker Prizes; the NIH
has sponsored the work of over 70 Nobel laureates and more than 60
members of the National Academy of Sciences are affiliated with
NIH. 1 The NIH is also expensive. Of the federal government's $50
billion annual research and development budget, the NIH receives
approximately $7-8 billion. The majority of Congress and the scientific
community believe that this money is well spent. While the U.S. has
slipped from its position as world leader in numerous areas, it maintains
preeminence in the area of biomedical research. For decades, the NIH
has attracted leading scientists from around the nation because of its
unique mission of performing basic biomedical research. At NIH,
investigators, unlike their colleagues in academia or industry, have been
able to do research without the external constraints of teaching, grant
acquisition or profit generation. In 1983, then Secretary of Health and
Human Services, Margaret Heckler, commented that "NIH is an island
of objective and pristine scientific research excellence untainted by
* Mr. Harnett received a BA from SUNY (Binghamton) in English and biology,
an MA in cellular/molecular biology from American University, and a JD from
Georgetown University. He now practices patent law in New York City.
1 Palca, Privatization not the Answer to NIH Problems, 336 NATURE 22 (1988).
See also, Kosterlitz, Bust Up a Winning Team? 20 Nat'l. J., Jan. 9, 1988, at 70.
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commercialization influences.'2
Governmental initiatives during the past four years have rendered
this statement false. As a response to the mounting budget deficit and
America's declining competitiveness in world markets, the federal
government has crafted a policy designed to encourage federally funded
scientists to develop the fruits of their research commercially.
On October 20, 1986, President Reagan signed the Federal
Technology Transfer Act (FTTA).3 In a subsequent report, Secretary
of Commerce, Robert A. Mosbacher, stated that, although the Act
challenged 4 "long-held views on the proper role of Federal
laboratories and scientists," he believed that, in retrospect, it would be
regarded as "one of the seminal developments in the history of federal
efforts to put technology to work for the taxpayers who paid for it."5
He cited dissatisfaction over the return on the nation's research and
development investment as justification for the FITA:6
Many in Congress and the Executive branch believed that
this investment, however vital for federal programs, was not
returning to the taxpayers sufficient dividends in terms of
new products, new processes, new jobs, and enhanced
international competitiveness.... A common complaint heard
was that the U.S. wins Nobel Prizes while other countries
walk off with the market.
While the FTTA has broad implications for federal research
2 Culliton, NIH, Inc.: The CRADA Boom, 245 SCIENCE 1036 (1989).
3 The Federal Technology Transfer Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-502, 100 Stat.
1785 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 3701 (1986)). See also, Executive Order 12591,
Facilitating Access to Science and Technology, dated April 10, 1987.
Implementation at NIH is addressed in NIH/ADAMHA-INDusTRY COLLABORATION
DIRECTORY (October 1989) (available from NIH Office of Invention Development).
4 R. MOSBOCHER, THE FEDERAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER ACT OF 1986: THE FRST
3 YEARS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS FROM THE SECRETARY OF
COMMERCE, July 1989 (available from Department of Commerce and NIH Office of
Invention Development).
5 Id. at2.
6 Id. at 3.
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facilities, this article will focus on its effects on the NIH. As
implemented there, the development of a new and useful medical
product will most likely occur pursuant to a cooperative research and
development agreement (CRADA). This arrangement is likely to result
in a government grant of an exclusive license to a private sector
participant in exchange for continued governmental research use and,
perhaps, payment of royalties to the agency and inventor. Under the
NIH CRADA policy,7 "inventors share 25 percent of the first
$50,000 of cumulative gross royalties on a licensed invention, 20
percent of the second $50,00 and 15 percent of the royalty income over
$100,000. "8
In four years under the FTTA, various aspects of research
performed at NIH has changed appreciably. As of October, 1989, in
what some commentators have called "the CRADA boom" or "CRADA
fever",9 NIH scientists had entered into 101 CRADAs, and the
overwhelming majority of these involved a partner from the corporate
sector.10 Reid G. Adler, Director of the NIH Office of Invention
Development, reported that his goal was "to make the mechanics of
negotiating a CRADA drop out of sight as NIH-industry collaborations
become business as usual"11 and projected that, by the end of 1989,
NIH would be a party to approximately 200 CRADAs.
This article will consider several potentially detrimental effects of
7 COU.AERATIoN DIRECTORY, supra note 2.
8 Implementation of the Federal Technology Transfer Act: Hearings before the
Subcomm. on Science, Research, and Technology, 101st Cong. 1st Sess. 104
(1989) (testimony of Reid G. Adler, Director, Office of Invention Development,
NIH)
9 See Culliton, supra note 2, at 1034.
10 Supra note 7.
11 See Culliton, supra note 2, at 1034. See also, 54 F.R. 38905 (Sept. 21,
1989), announcing the second annual NIH-ADAMHA Collaboration forum for
Oct. 3, 1989.
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such government/industry cooperation.
Does the FTTA Subsidize Industry?
Secretary Mosbacher has explained that one of the primary goals of
the FITA was to insure that taxpayers who contribute more than $63
billion each year to federal research and development are the principle
beneficiaries of those expenditures. 12 Among tangible benefits to
taxpayers resulting from successful transfer of technology from federal
laboratories to the private sector, he cited the generation of new
products, processes, industries and jobs.13
Such efforts predate the F'TTA. 14 For example, the Orphan Drug
Act15 fosters such cooperation in developing products which have a
limited market (i.e. treatment of rare diseases). This is in the public
interest if such products would not otherwise be developed or would be
substantially delayed.
However, the price of drugs is a concern. Representatives of the
industry argue that the prices of drugs are justified because substantial
investments are needed to bring them to market. Thousands of products
show promise, but, after millions of dollars are spent on research, only
a handful make it to the market. 16 Lisa Raines, Director of Government
Relations for the Industrial Biotechnology Association, maintains: "If
you want to limit the profits a company can reap from an invention, then
12 Supra note 4, at 1-2.
13 Id. ati.
14 See, e.g., Government Patent Policy Act of 1980, P.L. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015
(codified at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (Supp. 1990)). For a discussion of the
controversy predating that legislation, see, e.g., vanRavenswaay, Government
Patents and the Public Interest, 19 IDEA 331 (1978).
15 P.L. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (Codified at 21 U.S.C.A § 360aa et. seq.
(Supp. 1990).
16 See generally, e.g., Field, Pharmaceuticals and Intellectual Property..., 31
IDEA 3 (1990).
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the federal government should be willing to pick up the cost of the
development." 17
Conversely, if the government does pick up part of the costs, the
same level of profits may not be warranted. E.g., Representative Harry
Waxman, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Health and the
Environment, has observed:18
Through the auspices of the National Institutes of
Health, government has developed AIDS and cancer drugs
and turned them over to private industry, which has
exercised little or any restraint in charging sick people.... We
shouldn't ask sick people to subsidize one of our nation's
most profitable industries - the drug companies.
Also, Dr. Sidney Wolfe, Executive Director of Public Citizen's
Health Research Group objects to exclusive licenses granted without
governmental consideration of pricing:19
When you're talking about something involving AIDS or
cancer that's used by tens of thousands of people here and
worldwide, I don't believe an incentive is needed.., as
there's too much money to be made to discourage several
companies from participating.
For example, AZT, first shown by government scientists to be
useful in the treating AIDS, initially cost patients more than $10,000 per
year and still costs approximately $6,500.20 Spokespersons for Public
Citizen point out the multiple folly of such a system: Taxpayers pay for
the development of the drugs, and the subsequent grant of exclusive
licenses to pharmaceutical companies drive up prices due to a lack of
competition. Further, the government often pays for the treatment:2 1
It's... an extreme example of robbing Peter to pay Paul,




20 Gladwell & Specter, Changes Asked On Licensing Of AIDS Drug, The Wash.
Post, Oct. 27, 1988, at A 3.
21 Supra note 17
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because what the government is doing is failing to clamp
down on the prices of these drugs that evolve from
government-funded research and then out of the other pocket
paying tens or hundreds of millions of dollars more.
Yet, as one NIH official has observed, without granting exclusive
licenses to private companies, numerous potentially valuable products
would never make it to market:22
Most of the time it's like pulling teeth to get something
commercialized... [, and] there's no way to tell whether
research will lead to an invention and whether someone
knows what to do when they invent something. Most of the
time they're just happy that someone is willing to take the
second step.
While these are difficult problems, there are others which pose a
bigger risk to basic research at the NIH.
The FTTA and NIH Funding
The very existence, development and maintenance of the NIH is a
testament to the fact that American society values basic scientific
research. While its research does not always present immediate financial
benefits, it does generate advances in knowledge and technology which
enrich society beyond measure. Yet, the federal salary structure for
scientists conducting basic biomedical research reflects a notion that
good scientists will labor for nothing more than the love of knowledge.
Traditionally, NIH scientists have been willing to accept lower
salaries because of their ability to do pioneering research free of teaching
responsibilities and the necessity to seek grants. However, the disparity
between public and private sector pay is wide and growing wider. A
recent publication by the National Academy of Sciences Institute of
Medicine reported that, within the last five years, 42 senior scientists left
NIH to work at other institutions.23 These researchers, earning
22 Id&
23 Specter, Panel Opposes Turning NIH Into Private Institution, The Wash. Post,
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between $77,000 and $99,500, were among the highest paid at the
NIH. The average base pay for leading researchers at medical schools
exceeds the top federal pay level by 45-70%.24 Dr. William Raub,
Deputy Director of NIH, reports that within the last ten years NIH has
lost 28% of its senior work force because of transfer to academia and
industry.2 5 Dr. Robert Gallo, believes that NIH "is in a semi-crisis....
It's just too wide a [salary] gap now.... We're living next to people
making too much money".26
Samuel 0. Thier, President of the National Academy of Sciences
Institute of Medicine suggests, "biotechnology has reduced that chasm
between what you're doing and what they're paying you to do it. ''27
Also, Nobel laureate Joshua Lederberg has said:28
I see nothing wrong with losing top people if other
institutions are prepared to support them. There are many
other things that need to be done that don't have that faddish
appeal.
Dr. Lederberg's comments are valid assuming that the federal
government is committed to maintaining a strong, federally supported,
independent basic research establishment. Director Wyngaarden has
suggested a need to "throw money at it."2 9 The question is: Where is
the money to come from?
Philip Chen, Associate Director for Intramural Affairs at NIH,
suggests that collaborations with the private sector are simply a
Dec. 20, 1988, at A 14.
24 J&d
25 Thompson, The "No Pay Raise" Blues, The Wash. Post, Feb. 14, 1989, Health
Section, at 2-27.
26 Olde, Fauci Seen As Leading NIH Slate; But Heart May Lie With Aids Post,
The Wash. Post, Sept. 1, 1989, at A 25.
27 Kosterlitz, supra note 1, at 72.
28 Id. at 74.
29 Garrett, Health Center in a Crisis Of Its Own, Newsday, June 21, 1988,
(Discovery Section), at 1.
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mechanism to satisfy the political policy objective of transferring
technology.30 Some, however, believe otherwise. The FITA could
potentially get more money into the hands of researchers: Annual
royalties may be as high as $100,000 as a result of collaborations with
the private sector. Dr. Anthony Fauci, for example, has expressed
concern that this private support may result in withdrawal of federal
funds and noted that "It would be naive to think otherwise. ' 31
Such a proposal was contained in a 1987 Office of Management and
Budget draft which suggested that the Bethesda campus should be
operated like a private university.32 However, this generated strident
objections and has not received serious consideration. Nevertheless,
during the past five years, private sector influence at the NIH has
significantly increased.
Distinguished NIH researchers are involved in the following work
with private companies: the study of retroviral-mediated gene transfer
for AIDS therapy with Genetic Therapy, Inc.; research directed at
developing a vaccine for the prevention of AIDS with British
Biotechnology Limited; and a project involving AIDS vaccine
development with IMMUNe.33
While such CRADAs have been accepted by the NIH
administration, having research intertwined with industrial objectives
means that NIH scientists have a pecuniary interest in the commercial
development of their inventions. Thus, the quality of basic research at
NIH will decline as the focus turns to applied research. Although the
proponents of the FITA may be correct in asserting that the transfer of
technology from the federal laboratories to the private sector will result
30 See Booth, NIH Scientists Agonize Over Technology Transfer, 243 SCIENCE
20, 20-21 (1989).
31 Id.at21.
32 Beardsley, Bethesda Brain Drain, 258 Scl AM. 34 (June 1988).
33 See COLLABORA'IION DnEcroRy, supra note 2.
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in more jobs, more products brought to market, and a boon to the
economy, such a position is, nevertheless, myopic.
This has given rise to concerns such as expressed by Joseph Rall,
Deputy Director for Intramural Research at NIH:34
I'd rather see NIH scientists think about fundamental
problems... than [say] "I bet I could improve this technique
and that some company could make a million dollars and I
could make $10,000."
By institutionalizing the scientific researcher's reliance on the private
sector, the federal government is, to a great extent, abdicating its role in
the support of basic science. If the next paradigm shift35 in biomedical
sciences does not present immediate commercial prospects, the U.S.
may lose its position as world leader in basic research. Government
policies which exalt the conduct of "normal" science, simply because of
its commercial potential, at the expense of science which may generate a
"scientific revolution," are unwise and potentially dangerous. If the
federal infrastructure for the conduct of basic science is eroded - a
distinct possibility under the policies of the FITA - the U.S. will walk
away with neither the markets nor the Nobel Prizes.
Further Challenges
Conflicts of Interest
Scientific researchers in federal and university laboratories have
traditionally been subject to pressures arising from the "publish or
perish" ethic. While instances of outright fraud are rare, the temptation
to "fudge" data to secure publications and grants has been ever present.
The effects of such behavior is usually limited because published
experimental results are constantly tested for replicability.3 6 Still,
34 Supra note 30.
35 T. KuHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCEmTC REVOLUTIONS (1970).
36 See, e.g., Opinion Editorial, How Much Fraud in Science? The Wash. Post,
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leaders of the scientific community, recognizing that allegations of
scientific fraud and misconduct are potentially devastating, are vigilant
in protecting the integrity of scientific research.
NIH investigations of scientific misconduct have demonstrated its
commitment to maintaining public confidence in the integrity of
biomedical research. Yet, collaboration with the private sector may
increase the temptation to misrepresent research potential in order to
increase income or laboratory resources.
Sheldon Krimsky of Tufts University has observed: 37
I have heard it said within the scientific community that
everyone gains from this marriage of academia and
commerce. Nothing could be further from the truth. Not
only are there losses, but some of these losses threaten the
integrity of our scientific institutions and weaken public
confidence in science.
Representative Weiss insists that "all federally funded research
should be free of the taint of potential conflicts of interest."38 Yet, in
avoiding this, the NIH is faced with the difficult task of balancing the
need to maintain scientific integrity and independence while promoting
commercialization under the FITA.
That such concerns are well-founded is illustrated by an October
1988, report in the Boston Globe of an NIH grantee, who was
simultaneously testing an experimental drug on hundreds of patients and
setting up a company to produce and distribute it.39 Although the drug
ultimately proved ineffective, the researcher and his family earned in
excess of $1 million from the sale of the company stock.
July 6, 1989, at A 16. Compare W. BROAD & N. WADE, BETRAYERS OF THE TRurH
60 (1982).
37 Bass, Privately Funded Research may Breed Conflicts, United Press Int'l, June
13, 1989.
38 Gosselin, Flawed Study Helps Doctors Profit on Drug, Boston Globe, Oct. 19,
1988, (National/Foreign Section), at 1.
39 Ia
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Also, in the fall of 1988, several published reports indicated that as
many as twelve government funded scientists, while conducting clinical
trials on TPA, a clot-dissolving drug manufactured by Genentech,
owned Genentech stock. The fact that Genentech was in competition
with another company that manufactured streptokinase, a similar drug,
raised questions regarding the reliability of their safety and efficacy
data.40
In attempting to avoid such difficulties, the NIH, in December 1988,
conducted a two day retreat with 42 legal and scientific experts to
discuss conflict of interest. On June 22 and 23, 1989, an open meeting
was held, and proposed guidelines to regulate conflicts of interest were
published, with a request for comments, on September 15.41
The purpose behind the guidelines was "to ensure that NIH- and
ADAMHA-supported research is carried out in a completely objective
manner, and that the research results are not influenced by the
possibility of financial gain ".... 42
Perhaps because NIH officials found themselves between the Scilla
and Charybdis, in January 1990, Secretary Sullivan announced the
withdrawal of the proposed guidelines. 4 3 However, a recent
announcement sets a meeting for November 30, 1990 to further
consider the topic.44
PHS [Public Health Service] is considering issuance of
additional rules to promote the integrity of PHS-supported
clinical trials where investigators may have financial
40 Okie, Drug Testers Had Stock in Its Maker; Disclosure Raises Doubts About
Studies of Heart Treatment, The Wash. Post, Sept. 30, 1988, at A 6. See also,
Viewpoint, How Can Science Ignore This Conflict of Interest?, Newsday, Jan. 2,
1989, at 38.
41 NIH/ADAMHA Request for Comment on Proposed Guidelines for Policies on
Conflict of Interest, 18 (32) NIH Guide for Grants and Contracts, Sept. 15, 1989.
42 Id.
43 HS News, Dec. 29, 1989.
44 55 F.R. 45815 (Oct. 31, 1990).
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interests that could affect or give the appearance of affecting
their objectivity. Before doing so, the PHS... the... NIH
and the... ADAMHA will conduct a public meeting to
discuss... the issues involved.... The proposed approach...
outlined in this notice.., has taken into consideration the
comments received on the earlier proposed Guidelines
published... [on] September 15, 1989.
The announcement addresses general principles and proposes, e.g.,
that:45
Covered individuals would include investigators responsible
for designing, conducting or reporting research and their
spouses, dependents and business partners.
Then it sets forth the issues to be considered: 46
- The overarching issue is how best to protect the integrity of
research while promoting technology transfer.
* Should the basic regulatory approach (a) require disclosure
and allow flexibility for institutions to take appropriate
action, (b) state specific prohibitions, or (c) require
disclosure and decisions on appropriateness by the funding
agency?
- To what extent should... rules applicable to Federal
employees.., serve as a model in developing the proposed
requirements? (See 45 CFR part 73.)
- Are there regulatory frameworks not specific to PHS (e.g.
Federal Securities Laws) that are applicable to the topic?
• Who are the most appropriate parties to determine a conflict
of interest?
• Should all forms of financial interests be reviewed, for
example, equity, salary, other payment for services,
honoraria, and gifts?
• Are there minimal levels of financial interests which would
not create an actual or apparent conflict of interest?
• Should PHS require submission and approval of institu-
tional policies in order to ensure consistency and provide
technical assistance where necessary?
- Should PHS require disclosure to the funding agency of
approved financial interests, if any?
45 I&
46 Id
Harnelt: Technology Transfer Act 325
* Should there be a requirement for public disclosure of
financial interests, for example, in publications?
* Should there be disclosure of the investigators' financial
interests as part of the document seeking the research
subjects' informed consent to participation in clinical trials?
(In this regard, see... Moore v. Regents of University of
California..., 19 USPQ2d 1753... 1990).
" Should institutional financial interests be considered?
* What should the remedies be for violations?
Secrecy
More subtle consequences of FTTA implementation are also
possible. The proliferation of NIH-industry partnerships creates a
situation where researchers involved with similar projects with different
private concerns may be reluctant to share information for fear of
violating confidentiality agreements. 4 7 This could undoubtedly impede
research progress notwithstanding express objectives of the FTA.
Such problems are addressed in an NIH CRADA/licensing Policy
Statement.4 8 In discussing that statement in testimony before Congress
on the implementation of the FTA, Reid G. Adler asserted that NIH
has affirmed its commitment:49
to transfer technology within an overall framework that
promotes the free exchange of ideas and information by, for
example, preserving the freedom of our investigators to
publish the results, and attempts to safeguard the collegiality
and integrity of as well as public confidence in, the
NIH/ADAMHA research programs.
Thus, researchers are admonished to restrict the amount of
proprietary information exchanged during execution of a CRADA: 50
Although agreements to maintain confidentiality are
47 See, e.g., supra at note 33.
48 NIH OFFICE OF INVENTION DEVELOPMENT, NH/ADAMHA PATENT POLICY
BOARD POLICY STATEMENT ON COOPERATIVE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT
AaIEmNrs AND NmLwAL PROPERTY LICENSING (March 27, 1989)
49 Supra note 8.
50 Supra note 47, at 3.
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permitted under a CRADA, collaborators should limit their
disclosure of proprietary information to the amount
necessary to carry out the research plan of the CRADA. The
mutual exchange of confidential information, e.g., patent
data should be similarly limited. NIH/ADAMHA also
recognize that cooperative research may require the exchange
of proprietary research materials.... All parties to the
CRADA will agree to keep CRADA research results
confidential.., until they are published in the scientific
literature or presented at a public forum.
Yet, Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute of Allergy
and Infectious Diseases, has said that: "In 21 years at NIH I have never
gotten a blank stare before [when asking peers about reagents or
enzymes]; [n]ow I am beginning to get blank stares." 5 1 Also, Samuel
Broder, Director of the National Cancer Institute, has said: 52
People are worried that if they talk too much about their
CRADA research, they may inadvertently disclose too much
proprietary information and be sued by the company. The
ideal thing to do is file a patent quickly and then fully
disclose everything right away.
That solution, while helpful, is unsatisfying. Under such
circumstances, a first "inventor" who does not perfect the invention
effectively prevent competitors from developing it. Such activity would
appear to interfere with public access to the benefits of NIH research
and the articulated goals of the FITA.
Conclusions
Proponents of the FITA may assert that biomedical technology
the investigation and use of recombinant DNA techniques, genetic
engineering, gene therapy, monoclonal antibodies, etc. - is ready for
commercial application and should be exploited. However, again, an
investigator faced with the choice of continuing along a particular line of
51 Supra note 30, at 21.
52 See Culliton, supra note 2, at 1036.
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research directed toward the improvement of, for example, an in vitro
diagnostic assay, or embarking on project with no foreseeable
commercial value, is likely to pursue the former. If this is true, the
mission of the NIH will shift from long term "conduct [of]
biomedical...research that will lead to the better health of the American
people" 5 3 to short term commercial development of products and
processes that will lead to the better health of the American people.
Comments that Nobel Prizes represent an inadequate return on tax
dollars thus appear to be shortsighted, if not anti-intellectual. A
government policy which clearly demonstrates a commitment to support
basic scientific inquiry, regardless of its commercial viability, ennobles
society. The U.S. basic research establishment, including the NIH, is,
as Joshua Lederberg states, "a national treasure. ' 54 It should not be
threatened by unreasonable demands for immediate results of
commercial value.
As Thomas Kuhn asserted in his essay, "The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions," major scientific advances do not occur in a linear fashion
but, rather, occur in a series of quantum leaps or "paradigm shifts."55
Government officials have failed to recognize an essential aspect of
Kuhn's philosophy: The currently dominant biomedical paradigm is not
permanent. If policies which encourage (or mandate) scientists to
conduct commercially viable research become institutionalized in
biomedical science, American society may be perfectly positioned to
efficiently exploit this particular subset of technologies, but the
machinery for recognizing and developing subsequent paradigm shifts
may be irreparably compromised. Present implementation of the FITA
allows for progress in w hat Kuhn refers to as "normal science" - the
53 Supra note 47.
54 Kosterlitz, supra note 1, at 70.
55 Supra note 35.
I RISK-Issues i Health & Sfety 313 [Fall 19901
development of ideas within a paradigm - but may inhibit the
development of "revolutionary" scientific ideas. While stimulation of
American industry and trade are legitimate policy objectives,
accomplishment of these objectives at the expense of basic scientific
research is shortsighted. In the interest of rectifying the budget deficit
(created by still other policies which mortgaged the future for immediate
benefits) the current governmental policy may create a basic research
deficit early in the next century.
Commercializing the fruits of basic biomedical research is not, in
and of itself, a dangerous or threatening process, but it must be realized
that, while basic science is often the parent of applied research, basic
and commercially applied research are two distinct entities. Encouraging
private participation in the commercial exploitation of technology
developed as an incident to research is one thing; encouraging private
participation in directing basic research is another. Due primarily to the
excellence of U.S. basic biomedical research, it has advanced to the
point that its fruits have commercial value. To believe that this will
continue without support of research unconstrained by the need to show
immediate application is naive, and policies which proceed on that
assumption threaten to kill the goose that laid the golden egg.
